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INTRODUCTION

Goals of the Study

Christine Littleton asserts that the "underlying pragmatism of
feminist jurisprudence develops from the requirements of good
feminist methodology and theory.... [Tiheory that does not work
in practice is bad theory."' If she is correct, then, to change our
institutions, it is necessary to study effective ways to reform the
law. In that endeavor, it is helpful to begin by studying how
feminist legal theorists formulate their reform proposals.
In recent years, the debate over essentialism2 has become "a
central problem in contemporary feminist theory. . . ." Because
one can regard feminist legal theory as a sub-category of feminist
theory, this debate can have an impact on feminist legal theory as
well. By analyzing the anti-essentialism v. essentialism debate and
its implications, this article will try to investigate-the approaches
that contemporary feminist legal theorists propose for law reform,
whether these approaches can guide future research, and if so, in
what sense. Of course, law reform is ultimately an empirical
matter, the implementation of which can be affected by factors such
as judicial decisions and the political nature of the legislature.
Nevertheless, by studying law reform proposals under feminist
legal theory, we can begin to identify many of the issues involved in
formulating new law reform programs.
B.

Definition of Concepts
1.

Definition of Essentialism

Essentialism has been defined as: "the set of fundamental
attributes which are necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing
to be [considered] a thing of that type."" To define a thing is to
express its essence in words. Thus, definition involves two steps:

1. Christine A. Littleton, In Search of a Feminist Jurisprudence,reprintedin SOURCEBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 61, 63 (Hilaire Barnett ed., 1997) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
2. See infra Part I.B for a definition of the terms "essentialism" and "anti-essentialism."
3. Susan H. Williams, Utopianism, Epistemology, and Feminist Theory, 5 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 289, 298 (1993).
4. M.A. Ntumy, Essentialism and the Search for the Essence of Law, 18 MELANESIAN
L.J. 64, 64 (1990).
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first, distinguishing the object from other objects by referring to
certain parts of its characterization in order to capture its intuitive
essence, and second, characterizing the object within a single
concept so as to permit the definition to move to a discursive
understanding.5 The result is that the characteristics used to
define a thing are thought to inhere in its very essence and, thus,
to be unchangeable.'
The precise meaning of essentialism in feminist legal theory
has not been fixed. It can, for example, be biologically based, in
that "woman's" essence is assumed to be given and universal, as a
result of biology and natural characteristics. Alternatively, her
essence can be seen as originating from psychological characteristics, such as nurturance, empathy, or supportiveness' Either way,
essentialism assumes that all women share the same inherent
characteristics. 9 Naturally, anti-essentialists oppose such an
assumption.10
For instance, Drucilla Cornell argues that Robin West is an
essentialist because she "maps the feminine onto femaleness,"
meaning that West maintains that "women share a common
biological structure which affects [their] psychic identity." Antiessentialists, then, challenge the use of fixed characteristics, such
as biology and psychology, in defining women because they "limit
2
the possibilities of change and thus of social reorganization."1
2.

Definition of Law Reform

This article refers to "law reform" as an effort to change
existing patriarchal law and to empower women and improve their
position. Such efforts include providing women with the same
status, opportunities, and legal rights as men, the right to reproduc5. See id. at 65.
6. See Elizabeth Grosz, A Note on Essentialism and Difference, in FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE: CRITIQUE AND CONSTRUCT 334 (Sneja Gunew ed., 1990).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Daniel R. Ortiz, CreatingControversy: Essentialismand Constructivismand the
Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1848 (1993) ("Essentialists [in the feminist
context] are those who ascribe certain qualities to all women, qualities that antiessentialists
contest as to some women. The nub of their disagreement concerns the universalizability of
particular descriptions across the category of all women.").
11. DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECONSTRUC-

TION, AND THE LAW 26 (1991). See infra Part II1.C for a more detailed explanation of
Cornell's notion of essentialism.
12. Grosz, supra note 6, at 334.
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tive health care, and the right to be free from gender-based
violence.13

Most, if not all, feminist legal theories carry a commitment to
reform. Gary Lawson suggests that feminist legal theories can be
divided into five categories: (1) studies of the relationship between
women and the law; (2) scholarship that focuses on women alone;
(3) distinctive analytic methods that apply theories of rational
choice to legal problems; (4) ideas concerned with improving the
condition or status of women; and (5) work on specific policy issues
that reaches a particular set of normative conclusions. 14 While all
five of these categories arguably carry a commitment to law reform,
the fourth one is most clearly in line with my definition of law
reform. The theories of Robin West, Catharine MacKinnon,
Deborah Rhode, Drucilla Cornell, Angela Harris, and Patricia Cain
belong to the fourth category, and, for that reason, will be analyzed
in this article.
C. Scope and Methodology of the Study
This study focuses on the influence of feminist legal theories
that have shaped substantive laws and jurisprudence in developed
countries. Although most of the available literature on essentialism
and anti-essentialism in feminist legal theories comes from the
United States, a discussion of other authors' works from other
jurisdictions will be introduced whenever applicable.
This study begins by setting out the feminist law reform
theories proposed in the 1980s by Catharine MacKinnon and Robin
West,' 5 before discussing the anti-essentialist critiques of their
work in Part III. Part IV examines the major pitfalls in the
thinking of the anti-essentialists.
Part V questions whether there is any point in studying the
essentialism debate at all and responds that by studying such a
debate, we can, at the very least, question the validity of traditional
feminist legal theories. Furthermore, instead of continuously
generating criticisms about essentialism and anti-essentialism,
efforts to reform the law for women should concentrate on studying
13. These are the goals established at the International Conference on Population and
Development which was held in Cairo in 1994. See The United Nations Reports: The World's
Women 1970-90, in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at 3, 12.
14. See Gary Lawson, Feminist Legal Theories, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 325, 326-30
(1995).

15. The scope of this article is confined to the study of feminist legal theories. Therefore,
I will not discuss the works of feminists in nonlegal fields who have also been criticized for

being essentialist.
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alternatives to this dichotomy. Because an anti-essentialist critique
can be seen as essentialist itself, essentialism seems to be unavoidable. It is necessary, therefore, for alternative approaches to focus
on how to avoid the problems of essentialism, the largest of which
is privileging a particular group of "woman." At this point in time,
the best way to achieve this goal is to define the category of
"woman" as expansively as possible.
With this effort in mind, Part VI presents a number of alternative approaches proposed by contemporary feminist legal theorists.
The limited research that has been conducted does not allow for a
judgment as to which approach is more superior in addressing the
problems of essentialism. Nevertheless, future research should
focus on identifying the potential problems, uncovering and
developing alternative approaches that will avoid those problems,
and discussing the feasibility of the alternative approaches.
II.

FEMINIST LAW REFORM THEORIES IN THE 1980s

Since the 1980s, some feminist legal theories that aim to
reform the law have been criticized as being essentialist. Below are
two major law reform theories that have been subject to such a
critique.
A.

Robin West: Reconstructive Feminist Jurisprudence

Robin West criticizes liberal and radical feminist legal theories
and attempts to reconstruct feminist jurisprudence. First, she
points out that the existing laws do not recognize women's
injuries. 16 Instead, the legal system trivializes or dismisses
women's claims in some other way.17 For instance, father/daughter
incest is seen as participatory, subconsciously wanted, or selfinduced, and women's pain in childbirth is seen as natural or
biological and, therefore, inevitable. 8
West argues that women's subjective lives are relational, not
autonomous, because of their biological pregnability and their social
training for their roles as primary care-takers. 19 For instance,
during a woman's pregnancy, her physical life sustains the life of
another, and she anticipates the needs of her children when she
16. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critiqueof Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 82 (1987).

17. See id.
18. See id.

19. See id. at 140.
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nurtures them.20 West further argues that it is motherhood that
renders women vulnerable and materially unequal.2 ' The energy
and resources a woman must give to motherhood leave her exposed
to physical aggression and subsequently less able to feed herself.22
Thus, West sees mothers as caught in a web of dependency-relied
upon by those weaker than they are and, at the same time, relying
on those stronger than themselves.23 As a result, women's subjective lives are different from the traditional Western vision of human
24
life, which assumes that humanity is grounded in autonomy.
West then analyzes the liberal and radical feminist approaches
and concludes that their goals, which seek to accommodate the wellbeing of autonomous creatures, exclude women because women are
relational creatures. 25 Liberal legalism insists on choice as being
the way in which autonomy must be exercised.26 This is reflected,
for example, in the liberal advocacy of reproductive rights, as
clearly evidenced by the terminology "pro-choice."27 The liberal
position is problematic, however, because it denies the differences
between women.2" For instance, liberalism views non-consensual
sex as a compensable assault but fails to recognize that fear can
exist in "consensual" relationships.2 9 West argues that women
enter into relationships in order to be protected from "violent male
sexuality."" Such sexual transactions, however, are not actionable
under the liberal's conception of sexual harassment because they
are deemed to be consensual."' To West, the liberal strategy
misconceives "woman's" nature, and so legal reform based on liberal
feminism "miss [es] altogether the real causes of women's misery. "32
In contrast, radical feminist theories view autonomy in terms
of gaining power.33 Women currently are disempowered, but, on
gaining power, women can become more autonomous and, accordingly, more equal to men (read: human beings).' West objects to
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 141.

24. See id. at 140.
25. See id. at 141.

26. See id. at 139.
27. See id. at 139 n.88.

28.
29.
30.
31.

See id. at 141.
See id. at 108-10.
Id. at 108.
See id. at 109.

32. Id. at 108.

33. See id. at 139.
34. See id. at 141-42.

1999]

THE DEBATE AND BEYOND

279

this approach because it disregards women's subjective experiences.
For example, by defining pornography as the depiction of women's
subordination, radical feminists ignore the fact that some women
do find pornography pleasurable.35 West asserts that feminists
should fight to eradicate only the pornography that results in the
relinquishment of sexual control because of fear.36
To West, a "truly feminist jurisprudence" is one that is "built
upon feminist insights into women's true nature," as opposed to
"human" nature.3 7 Such a jurisprudence is impossible until the
patriarchy, which West defines as a political structure that values
men more than women, is abolished and the conceptual definition
of human being actually includes women. 3' Thus, West calls for the
adoption of a legal method directed at women's subjective wellbeing, one which would measure the effectiveness of a law by its
hedonic effect on women.3 9 In other words, a law that increases
women's happiness is good, and a law that ignores or increases
women's pain is bad.4 ° Such an approach would result in the
following advantages: (1) freeing women from the false conception
of their nature; (2) facilitating a clear articulation of the equality of
women's subjective lives; and (3) shifting legal discourse away from
a focus on the domination of women and toward their pain.4 ' In
the process of reconstructing feminist jurisprudence, feminist legal
theorists should re-articulate rights in terms that will reveal and
accommodate women's distinctive state of being.42
B.

CatharineMacKinnon: The Man's Foot Is on Her Throat

Catharine MacKinnon argues that the reason why sex equality
laws have been so ineffective with regard to solving women's
problems is that the question of sex equality uses maleness as the
reference point for analysis.4 3 MacKinnon asserts that equality
presupposes sameness but sex presupposes difference, resulting in
a built-in tension within the concept of "sex equality." MacKinnon
identifies the two approaches to equality that are typically invoked
35. See id. at 134-35.
36. See id. at 135-36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988).
See id. at 4.
See West, supra note 16, at 142.
See id.

41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 142-43.
See West, supranote 37, at 61.
See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-34 (1987).
See id. at 33.

280

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 5:273

by feminists---'be the same as men," and "be different from men"-but explains that both are the same in that they both take men as
the standard by which to judge women.4 5 MacKinnon shows that
the sameness standard has enabled men to get what women have
traditionally had, e.g., custody and alimony, rather than giving
women what men have traditionally had, e.g., equal pay and work.4 6
The difference standard, on the other hand, does not renumerate
women for their disparity.47 Instead, MacKinnon argues it has led
to the "protection" of women from jobs that might jeopardize their
fertility or safety.4 To MacKinnon, neither of these approaches
leads to sex equality.
MacKinnon suggests that the alternative would be to recast the
equality question in terms of the distribution of power, which she
calls the "dominance approach."4 9 To bring about change, male
dominance and female subordination should be explicitly recognized
and exposed.5" According to MacKinnon, however, the difference
definition of sex equality has silenced the abuse that women suffer
precisely because such abuse does not usually happen to men. 5
MacKinnon wants to provide women with equal power in social life
so that what they say truly matters: "Take your foot off our necks,
52
then we will hear in what tongue women speak."
III.

THE PROBLEMS OF BEING ESSENTIAL

The theories of West and MacKinnon have been challenged as
being "trapped by essentialism."5 3 The next section will explore in
depth four major critiques offered by the anti-essentialists.
However, before delving into the theory, it may be helpful to offer
a brief example of the problems in the law that result when women
are construed as being the same.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id. at 33-34.
See id. at 35-36.
See id. at 38.
See id.
See id. at 40.
See id.
See id. at 41.
Id. at 45.
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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Problems with Essentialism: An Example

In the United States, the Family and Medical Leave Act of
199354 grants unpaid leave for up to twelve weeks in any twelvemonth period to an employee who wants to take time off to care for
a spouse, child, or parent who has a serious health condition.5 5
Nevertheless, the Act has been criticized strongly for being
predicated on a standard of "woman" that is white and middleclass. 6 For instance, it has been argued that the Act leaves
marginally employed females unprotected because most cannot
afford to take unpaid leave.57 Moreover, the Act does not protect
lesbian families because its leave entitlements apply only to
spouses of the opposite sex and to legally recognized children."
Lesbians' entitlements to employer health insurance schemes and
other family benefits are also not protected by the Act.5 9
Thus, as shown in the above example, it is impractical to treat
all women as being the same when working to effect social change
through law reform.
B.

"theory" without "Theory"

Deborah Rhode criticizes MacKinnon's portrayal of all women
as being one "woman," thus neglecting the dynamics among them. °
Rhode recognizes that one problem with the standpoint adopted by
many contemporary feminists is that they ignore the inability of a
single overarching framework to truly reflect social experience. 6 '
Such theoretical stances are often too amorphous to explain the
particular ideology and history behind each relationship.
More specifically, Rhode finds that MacKinnon's
top-down analysis presents a limited view of relations both
within and between gender groups .... Feminism gains its
54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
55. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(C), (c), (d)(1).
56. See Rosemary Hunter, Deconstructingthe Subjects ofFeminism: The Essentialism
Debate in Feminist Theory and Practice,6 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST L.J. 135, 149 (1996).
57. See id. An employee can, of course, use any paid leave to which she is entitled under
her employment contract. Beyond that amount, however, any leave she takes within the
twelve week period will be unpaid. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c), (d)(1)-(2)(A).
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(7), (12)-(13); see also Hunter, supra note 56, at 149.
59. See Hunter, supra note 56, at 149.
60. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 83

(1989).
61. See Deborah L. Rhode, The 'Woman's Pointof View," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39, 41 (1988).
62. See id.; RHODE, supra note 60, at 316.
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power from the claim to speak on behalf of women and to
identify common values, perceptions, and interests growing out
of women's experience. Yet that experience also teaches that
gender is mediated by other patterns of inequality, involving
race, class, age, ethnicity, and sexual orientation. On-a descriptive level, dominance-oriented paradigms that divide the world
solely along gender lines ignore the ways that common biological constraints are experienced differently by different groups
of women. On a prescriptive level, no theory adequate to
challenge gender subordination can avoid addressing the other
forms of inequality with which it intersects.3
In other words, a theory of gender dominance alone does not
adequately address the mutual dependencies and complex power
dynamics that exist between men and women.s4 As an example,
Rhode suggests that the relationship between a wealthy white
woman and her non-white male domestic staff does not comport
with MacKinnon's version of gender hierarchy.6 5
As an alternative to MacKinnon's essentialist approach, Rhode
suggests that feminist legal theorists should develop a vision of the
relations among men and women, not just between them.6 6 She
therefore asserts that feminists need theory without imposing on
themselves a universal Theory. 7 In other words, they need to be
more self-critical and aware; they must take pains to address the
context of each situation and not to fall prey to vast generalizations.68
C.

Deconstruction

Drucilla Cornell attacks essentialist approaches in postmodernist terms. She argues that both West and MacKinnon succumb to
essentialism and ddr~lection in the approaches they take to law
reform, and she argues that deconstruction can address those
problems.6 9 Cornell's use of essentialism allows for a definition of
"woman" that is based on biological and non-biological characteris-

63. RHODE, supra note 60, at 83-84.

64. See id. at 84.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 317.

67. See id. at 316.
68. See id. at 317 ("We need fewer abstract theoretical typologies and more historically
and empirically grounded analyses. Detailed blueprints of the ideal structure are less
important than strategies to engage more participants in the reconstructive enterprise.").
69. See CORNELL, supra note 11, at 4-6.
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tics.7 :Cornell defines dhrlection as a state of being "in which
feminine difference cannot be expressed except as signified in the
masculine imaginary or the masculine symbolic."71 Basically,
ddrlectionoccurs when women define themselves through the male
conceptual order.72
Cornell criticizes West for "collaps[ing] woman's essence into
her nature."7 3 She agrees with West that women's experience must
be expressed, however, she asserts that one cannot rely on some
universal concept of "woman" to ground this experience.74 It is in
the reliance on the "masculine fantasy of woman as mother" where
Cornell finds West's dgrlection.75 By locating the feminine in the
maternal, West ignores the fact that some women will never be
mothers, and those who do will not all experience motherhood in
the same way.76 The result of such a stance is to preclude the
possibility of formulating new bases for sexual difference.77
To Cornell, MacKinnon is also an essentialist.78 Under
MacKinnon's theory, female sexual difference causes women's
subordination.79 Unlike West, however, MacKinnon's essentialism
has nothing to do with biology. 0 Rather, MacKinnon sees gender
definitions as being complete products of "social reality."8 ' Still,
MacKinnon is also a victim of ddrlectionbecause this social reality
that defines femaleness is constructed through the male gaze and
reinforced by men's power.8 2 Thus, under MacKinnon's rubric, any
celebration of the feminine is actually an affirmation of the male's,
vision of the feminine and3 thereby furthers women's complicity in
their own subordination.
Cornell rejects such a view and proposes the use of Derridean
deconstruction as the solution.' Cornell believes that the feminine
must and should be affirmed.85 It is only through the writing and
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Williams, supra note 3, at 290.
CORNELL, supra note 11, at 7.
See Williams, supra note 3, at 292-93.
CORNELL, supra note 11, at 26.
See id. at 57, 59.
Id. at 6-7.
See id. at 57-59.
See id. at 63; Williams, supra note 3, at 293.
See CORNELL, supra note 11, at 126.
See id. at 119; Williams, supra note 3, at 293.
See CORNELL, supra note 11, at 119.

81. See id. at 120.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 126.
84. See id. at 18 ("Derridean deconstruction exposes... any system of ideality established as reality....").
85. See id. at 20.
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re-writing of feminine "reality," which hopefully encompasses all of
the different realities that women experience, that feminists have
the opportunity to present different versions of sexual difference.86
Cornell advocates using myth to propel this writing, for it is
through the reinterpretation of mythical figures that women can
create the "dream of an elsewhere" that escapes the established
patriarchy.8"
D.

Multiple Consciousness

Angela Harris also attacks West's and MacKinnon's versions of
essentialism because they ignore factors, such as race, class, sexual
orientation, and modes of production, that can influence women's
experience."8 She believes that black women possess "a self that is
neither 'female' nor 'black,' but both-and." 9
According to Harris, West makes three basic assumptions:
everyone has a "self," that "self is stable and unchanging, and it
differs between men and women solely along the lines of gender.9 s
Implicit in West's dichotomy is the insistence that women's
experiences vis-h-vis men are uniform and, more importantly,
white-for only white people have the "luxury" of being able to
ignore their racial identity.9 1
MacKinnon also "introduces [white women] as universal
truth." 2 MacKinnon uses what Harris terms a "nuance theory"using white women as the norm. Thus, black women's difference
becomes only a matter of degree.93 Furthermore, those degrees of
difference vanish altogether when women are constructed as
"woman" under the male gaze. 94 Subsequently, MacKinnon is able
to blame the dominant discourse for her own essentialism.95
Harris faults MacKinnon for failing to listen to women's
stories.9" She uses MacKinnon's treatment of rape as one such
example.9 7 To MacKinnon, black women experience rape the same
86. See id. at 2.
87. See id. at 173.
88. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 581, 585 (1990).
89. Id. at 604.
90. See id. at 603.
91. See id. at 604-05.
92. Id. at 592.
93. See id. at 595.
94. See id. at 592.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 601'
97. See id at 598-601.
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way that white women do, "only more so. " " Rather, Harris
counters, for black women, race has as much to do with rape as does
gender and, thus, renders rape a very different experience.9 9 For
black women have not just feared "the strange black man in the
bushes," they also'have had to guard against "the white employer
in the kitchen."'0 0 In addition, unlike white women, black women's
chastity has not been protected by the state; in fact, for most of
American history, the law did not even acknowledge the possibility
that black women could be raped.'0 '
Like Cornell, Harris also turns to storytelling as the solution.01 2
Harris believes that it is through women speaking of their experiences-experiences that, for women of color, 10 3 reveal a multiple
consciousness-that feminist legal theory can be re-energized.' 4 A
"multiple consciousness," consists of a combination of a universal
perspective, a specific perspective, and all points in between. It is
relational and it changes according to individuals' wills and the
institutions within which they exist.' In using a model of multiple
consciousness as the feminist jurisprudential method, according to
Harris, women can begin to identify the many, often conflicting,
voices within themselves and overcome the temptation to speak for
all women in one universal voice.'0 6
E.

Lesbian Legal Theory versus Feminist Legal Theory

Patricia Cain suggests that most feminist legal theorists fall
into the "essentialist trap" because they focus on women's sameness
and ignore any differences.' 7 As with Cornell and Harris, Cain
agrees that feminist methods that listen to women and believe their
stories in order to glean women's experiences must be the basis for
an accurate feminist legal theory.' 8 Cain notes, however, that
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See
See
Id.
See
See

id. at 598.
id.
id. at 598-99.
id. at 590.

103. Harris does recognize the need to avoid racial essentialism. See id. at 588-89.
However, she asserts that black women, specifically, are in the best position to express a
multiple consciousness. See id. at 608.
104. See id. at 608, 615-16.
105. See id. at 581-84.

106. See id. at 608-09, 615.
107. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Groundingthe Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 205 (1989-90).

108. See id. at 195 ("If we are careful to listen to women when they describe the harms
they experience as women, we are likely to get the legal theory right ....

).
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existing feminist legal theories clearly have not used these methods
sufficiently because they have excluded lesbian experience.'0 9 Thus,
Cain first posits that because the lesbian experience uncovers that
a core element of patriarchy is heterosexuality, it is integral to and
must be incorporated into the formulation of feminist theory." 0
Cain maps out two common critiques of male-centered realitythe "woman as mother" standpoint and the "woman as sexual
subordinate" standpoint-that reflect West's and MacKinnon's
views, respectively."' While she concedes that both stances are
valid approaches in that they expose experiences that are vastly
different from those of men,"' she warns against confusing the
reality of many women with that of all women." 3
Cain contends that a "lesbian standpoint," in contrast, enables
one to see both the mainstream and the minority versions of reality
at the same time." 4 Through the lens of the dominant perspective,
"lesbians are not mothers, all women are dominated by men," and
"lesbians don't have families. ... 5 Yet in the reality that Cain
lives, "some mothers are lesbian, many lesbian women are not
dominated by men,... all lesbians are born into families, lesbians

are family."" 6 Thus, while West tells us that not all people are
separate, Cain reminds us that not all women are connected;"' and
when MacKinnon claims that all women are subordinate to male
dominance, the lesbian experience shows us that some women are
able to escape the patriarchy for a sufficient amount of time in
which to develop a genuine sense of self."' Because a lesbian
standpoint can reveal a different kind of oppression than a
nonlesbian experience would, it can empower women as a group to
end all oppressions."'
Nevertheless, in her later work, Cain changes her argument
from one urging the incorporation of a lesbian perspective into
current feminist legal theory to one advocating for the development

109. See id. at 205, 213.
110. See id. at 191-92.
111. See id. at 210-13.
112. See id. at 210.
113. See id. at 213 ("Feminist legal theorists must be careful not to confuse 'standpoint
critiques' with existential reality.").
114. See id. at 213-14.
115. Id. at 213.
116. Id. at 214.
117. See id. at 213.
118. See id. at 212.
119. See id. at 213.
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of a separate lesbian theory altogether. 20 Although she acknowledges that a lesbian legal theory could be vulnerable to essentialism, Cain argues that it is nevertheless needed because lesbians
and feminists are not interchangeable.' 2 ' The goals of legal
theorists from both groups may overlap, but yet they are distinct:
feminists seek only to reform heterosexuality while lesbians seek to
dismantle it.122 Thus, a separate lesbian legal theory is necessary,
according to Cain, to help lesbians realize lesbian ideals within a
heterosexual world. At the same time, however, lesbian theorists
must strive to avoid essentializing all lesbians when formulating
such ideals. 2 '
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH ANTI-ESSENTIALISM

These critiques of essentialism identify problems with the.
theories of West and MacKinnon. Nevertheless, the critiques are
not without problems themselves. The theories of Harris, Cain, and
especially that of Cornell, have generated their own set of criticisms. Because each of the feminist legal theorists previously
mentioned defines essentialism in a slightly different manner, a
separate discussion of the critiques of their theories will follow.
A.

A Critiqueof DrucillaCornell

It is unclear how Cornell's approach can avoid the problems of
essentialism and dgr&lection itself. As an alternative to the
essentialism in the theories of MacKinnon and West, Cornell urges
women to affirm the feminine, which, according to her, can be found
only in writing.'24 Cornell suggests the use of myth and allegory in
writing about women for two reasons. First, as already mentioned,
the reinterpretation and re-creation of mythical figures can help
women become aware of a dream beyond the patriarchy.'2 5 Second,
the constancy of myth26 offers women touchstones for an identification of the feminine.

120. See Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of
Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 43, 70 (1994).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 71.
123. See id. at 73.
124. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
126. See CORNELL, supra note 11, at 173.
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Nevertheless, the possibility remains that attempts to write the
12 7
feminine may be used as an "essentialist weapon" against women.
As Susan Williams points out, "[a]ny theory with enough power to
be useful can also be misused." 2 ' Furthermore, despite the two
advantages that the use of myth could bring, Cornell does not
specify whether she is referring to myths in the mainstream culture
or myths from all cultures.'2 9 If she intends the former, she will put
all women in the position of expressing their reality through the
myths of Western culture. 130 Alternatively, if Cornell means to
include myths from all cultures, she has not discussed how myths
from foreign cultures would have meaning to a Western audience.' 3 '
Finally, to avoid ddrlection, Cornell suggests that deconstruction can provide the way out of the current gender identity
system.'3 1 However, deconstruction requires alternative perspectives.'33 Yet, Cornell suggests that the source of these perspectives
originates in people who are confined by the current conceptual
system.'13 Cornell does not tell us how one can create a new
conceptual framework from the old.135 Furthermore, "what exists
beyond [one conceptual system] is just other conceptual systems."3 6
A new conceptual system may thereby create the same problems of
dgr~lection as the current system. Thus, Cornell's theory does not
give us a way to escape dr&lection.
B.

A Critique of Angela Harris

As an alternative to West's and MacKinnon's essentialist
methods, Harris suggests that feminists should use the concept of
37
multiple consciousness to develop a jurisprudential method.'
Archana Parashar has argued that Harris' critique does not go far
enough.' 3 8 First, Harris does not show how analyzing the distinct
127. See Williams, supra note 3, at 306.
128. Id. ("The most that we can ask, up front, is that the misuse not be inevitablenecessary to the very benefit we hope to gain from the theory-and that the benefit appear
to be worth the risk.").
129. See id. at 306-07.
130. See id. at 306.
131. See id. at 307.
132. See supra note 84.
133. See Williams, supra note 3, at 308.
134. See id. at 309.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See supranotes 88-89, 105 and accompanying text.
138. See Archana Parashar, Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism,
6 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 328, 337 (1993).
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experience of black women can help develop a better critique of the
law. 3 9 Second, Harris does not offer any justification as to why
black women's experiences should be valued more than other
oppressed groups.1 40
In Harris' defense, Harris does delineate three advantages that
black women's experiences can specifically offer to feminist theory,
all of which can help avoid the problem of essentialism: namely,
the recognition that a self is multiplicitous, that differences are
always relational, and that wholeness and commonality are willful
acts of creativity.'
Furthermore, Harris does point out that a
multiplicitous self is not unique to black women.'4 2
Nonetheless, Harris' argument is problematic because she
appears to suggest that only women of color possess a multiplicitous
self and that a dividing line can be drawn between white and nonwhite women in terms of their race:
In this society, it is only white people who have the luxury of
'having no color'; only white people have been able to imagine
that sexism and racism are separate experiences. ....
The
challenge to black women has been the need to weave the
fragments, our many selves, into an integral, though always
changing and shifting, whole.... 143
Thus, by drawing such distinctions, Harris suggests that white
women suffer from only one form of oppression-that is, gender
oppression. Additionally, because she seems to have assumed that
there can be a monolithic "White Experience," she uses a particular
kind of experience to define white women and thus essentializes
them.
C.

A Critique of PatriciaCain

In her earlier work, Cain faults the theories of West and
MacKinnon for excluding the lesbian experience because she
believes that it exposes a core element of male-centered reality-heterosexuality. 4 4
Although Cain shows that lesbians'
oppression can be different from that of nonlesbian women,"4 she
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id.
See id.
See Harris, supranote 88, at 608.
See id.
Id. at 604.
See supranote 110 and accompanying text.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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assumes that heterosexuality is a core element of male-centered
reality. Her reliance on this assumption weakens her argument for
the inclusion of lesbian experience into feminist theory because, as
Cain herself acknowledges, society could theoretically eliminate
patriarchy but still be heterosexist.'
In her later work, Cain suggests that, as an alternative to
West's and MacKinnon's theories, the category of "lesbian" should
be employed in a separate lesbian legal theory, rather than
incorporated into feminist legal theory. 147 Cain objects to the use of
the category of "woman" in feminist legal theory but nonetheless
proposes the adoption of "lesbian" as a category within a separate
lesbian theory for two reasons: first, "lesbian" is too new a category
to withstand deconstruction, 148 and second, she believes a central
149
experience exists for all lesbians that creates a lesbian identity.
Even so, "[lesbian] identity, like most forms of human identity,
is too variegated, contested, and complex for any single term to
capture."1 50 Daniel Ortiz acknowledges that the temptation to
create a single master description of homosexual identity largely
stems from the need to develop a political argument that can overcome heterosexism.' 5 ' He suggests that in Bowers v. Hardwick,52
the advocates for gay rights sought to overturn a Georgia sodomy
statue by desexualizing the description of gay identity-to wit, they
characterized the defendant's acts as "intimate associations" rather
than as oral sex.1" 3 Yet according to Ortiz, the search for a uniform
description of a group is self-defeating because "[als a group
describes itself in thicker and thicker terms, disagreement within
the group invariably appears over the content of the self-description. "
Similarly, under Ortiz's analysis, the use of "lesbian" as a
single category inevitably will generate disagreement among
lesbians.

146. See Cain, supra note 120, at 71.
147. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
148. See Cain, supra note 120, at 56-61.
149. See id. at 61-68. Cain asserts that the moment a woman recognizes her emotional
and erotic attachment to another woman constitutes a core experience for all lesbians,
regardless of their other characteristics. See id. at 66. In contrast, the experiences of
motherhood and male domination are not always central to the construction of oneself as a
woman. See id. at 62-64.
150. Ortiz, supra note 10, at 1836.
151. See id. at 1850.
152. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
153. See Ortiz, supra note 10, at 1851-52.
154.. Id. at 1856.
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V.

A.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ESSENTIALISM DEBATE

Value of Studying the Debate

The discussion presented in the preceding sections suggests
that taking either an essentialist or an anti-essentialist stance
toward law reform may be misplaced. A study of the different
approaches is valuable nonetheless. Such a study can help identify
critical obstacles that prevent feminists from achieving their goals.
Furthermore, we can better question the validity of more traditional
approaches to law reform for women once we are armed with
knowledge of this debate.
Critics of essentialism, namely Cornell, Harris, and Cain, begin
their analyses by opposing the use of a white, middle-class category
of "woman" because such rigid gender identity excludes the
experiences of many women.1 55 Instead, they suggest the use of
more contextual analyses: deconstruction,' 5 6 "multiple consciousness," 157 and lesbian experience, 158 respectively. Although the
conclusions of these critics ultimately fall into the "essentialist
trap" themselves, the starting point of their analyses is worth
noting because it challenges the appropriateness of using the term
"woman" in a generic way. Moreover, it is important to understand
how essentialism functions, because the people it ignores are often
located at the bottom of the social hierarchy.'59 Thus, legal theories
based on essentialist approaches may not be equipped to effect true
social change.
The critiques presented in Parts III and IV suggest that
alternative approaches to essentialism and anti-essentialism should
be adopted when formulating feminist legal theories that seek to
reform the law. This raises questions as to the minimum criteria
such theories should meet and what form they might take. To
answer such questions, one must first consider whether essentialism is avoidable. If it is avoidable, then the alternative approaches
should at least be able to address the problems identified with antiessentialism. On the other hand, if essentialism is in fact unavoidable, it is necessary for the alternative approaches to be aware of,

155.
,156.
157.
158.
159.

See
See
See
See
See

supra Parts III.C-E.
supra Part III.C.
supra Part III.D.
supra Part III.E.
Harris, supra note 88, at 589.
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and to strive to avoid, the problems that it raises, which, at the very
least, include the privileging of a particular group of "woman."
B.

Is EssentialismAvoidable?

If essentialism is avoidable, the critiques offered by the antiessentialists should not themselves fall prey to essentialism.
However, the critiques of the anti-essentialists suggest that they do.
Cain argues that a core lesbian experience exists that is shared by
all lesbians. 6 ° Such experience does not change, regardless of
variations in race, class, or other factors. 6 ' Cain thus essentializes
lesbians. Harris, in drawing a distinction between the experiences
of white and nonwhite women, 162 essentializes women on both sides
of the color line. She ignores the differences among white women
that are informed by class and ethnicity, and she assumes that all
nonwhite women have a multiplicitous, relational conception of the
self.'6 3 Finally, if Cornell uses myths from a specific culture to
affirm the feminine,
she risks attributing a fixed set of characteris64
tics to all women. 1
Thus it would seem that essentialism is unavoidable because
there is always a need to define the category of "woman," whether
as white and middle-class, lesbian, or racial minority. Yet,
alternative approaches may exist that can avoid the corresponding
problem of privileging one group of "woman" over all others.
VI.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE ESSENTIALISM DEBATE

Given that the act of defining a category of people will necessarily include some and exclude others, feminists should acknowledge that almost any definition of "woman" will be vulnerable to the
attack that it essentializes women. Diane Brooks warns, however,
of the danger of political paralysis feminists will face if they are
165
unable to adequately define the group they seek to promote.
Thus, to move beyond the essentialism debate, feminist theorists
should try to avoid the problems of essentialism as much as

160. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 149.
162. See supra notes 91, 98-101 and accompanying text.
163. See Harris, supra note 88, at 608.
164. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
165. See Diane L. Brooks, A Commentary on the Essence ofAnti-Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 2 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 115, 130 (1994).
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possible. Several commentators have suggested different methods
for doing so.
By presenting these methods as follows, I am not suggesting
that they are the only alternatives to taking either the essentialist
or the anti-essentialist stance, nor that my analysis of these
approaches is conclusive. Nevertheless, given that essentialism is
unavoidable, as discussed in Part V.A, alternative approaches
should strive to avoid the problems that essentialism raises, which,
at the very least, include the privileging of a particular group of
"woman." By analyzing alternative approaches in light of such
minimum criterion which they must meet in order to achieve their
goal of law reform, I aim to offer a framework for future research in
feminist legal theories.
Rosemary Hunter catalogs several approaches that seek to
avoid essentialism.1 6 6 In a spirit of post-essentialism, she refuses
to privilege one strategy over any other. 167 The possibilities include:
68
using research and consultation with underrepresented women;
developing feminist strategies in response to particular experiences
rather than particular groups; 6 9 building coalitions that address
intersectionalities; 7 ° and continually deconstructing identity categories so that women can expand the types of legal claims they can
make.' 7
Specifically, by researching issues important to underrepresented women and consulting with such women regarding their
views on these issues, Hunter asserts that mainstream feminist
legal theorists can identify different perspectives, frame issues, and
set agendas in an all-inclusive manner. 172 For instance, in an
attempt to develop an analysis of gender, mainstream feminist legal
theorists should not merely identify minority women's experiences,
173
they should also take into account what gender means to them.
Nevertheless, the notion of "consultation" by the mainstream
feminist legal theorists presupposes their dominant position over
the "other" theorists. 74 Moreover, even if groups are consulted,
there are likely to be irreducible differences of views among them.
166. See Hunter, supra note 56.
167. See id. at 162.
168. See id. at 158-59.
169. See id. at 157.
Intersectionality refers to the intersection
170. See id. at 159-60.
oppressions---e.g., racism and sexism. See id. at 141-42.
171. See id. at 160-61.
172. See id. at 158.
173. See id. at 158-59.
174. See id. at 158.

of multiple
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Thus, if one position is adopted over the others, a theorist may still
privilege the views of one group of "woman" over another.
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, another theorist, favors moving away from
characterizing women's struggles as single issues because doing so
merely reinforces the status quo and further marginalizes those
who experience discrimination on different levels.'7 5 She points out
that to address the concerns of those who are singularly disadvantaged, a solution must first be found for the problems of multiply
oppressed people. 176 In making marginalized women central to the
definition of "woman," feminists can begin to build a collective and
77
unifying movement. 1
An intersectional analysis could indeed avoid the problem of
privileging the white, middle class "woman."
Nevertheless,
Crenshaw does not specify how the intersectional analysis should
be applied when there are multiple factors affecting the issue of
gender. Thus, in a case of sexual discrimination, for instance, her
analysis may not be able to avoid the privileging of a black woman
over a black lesbian.
Noting that "the 'problem of difference' is really the problem of
privilege,",17 Elizabeth Spelman, another theorist, asserts that
white, middle-class women should not let their fear, shame, and
guilt keep them from learning about women who suffer from other
forms of oppression in addition to sexism. 179 Yet her argument does
not end there-for focusing on the activity of white, middle-class
women only reinforces their privilege and does nothing to change
the definition of "woman."'8 0 Spelman challenges the notion
promoted by Simone de Beauvoir that studying the experiences of
white, middle-class women will best reveal sexism.'"' The very idea
that one must remove all other forms of oppression in order to
distill a more pure form of sexism shows that sexism does not

175. See KimberlI Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critiqueof AntidiscriminationLaw and
Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 356, 374 (David Kairys ed., 3d

ed. 1998). In her critique of anti-discrimination law, Crenshaw argues that the norm for race
discrimination is discrimination against black men, whereas an implicit norm for sexual
discrimination is discrimination against white women, which leaves out the particular
experience of black women, who suffer discrimination based on both sex and race. See id. at
358.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 374-75.
178. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 162 (1988).
179. See id. at 161-62.
180. See id. at 162-64.

181. See id. at 166.
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function in the same way against all women."8 2 Spelman argues
that gender cannot be separated from other characteristics."l 3
Nevertheless, because thinking about or referring to women as
"woman" is unavoidable, she reminds us that, in doing so, we must
" 184
remember "which women ... we are thinking about.
Thus, Spelman suggests that people should re-conceptualize
gender as a construct that incorporates all categories of description,
resulting in the possibility of recognizing many genders rather than
just two. 8 5 To those who fear that acknowledging many genders
might destroy any cohesion feminism has, Spelman responds that
an agenda presented by a heterogeneous group of women will be
stronger because it will reflect the desire of a larger number of

women. 186
Nevertheless, under the minimum criterion mentioned above,
Spelman's theory may still privilege a specific group of "woman."
In the process of re-conceptualizing gender, a theorist's own
cultural, economic and racial experiences may influence her
reconstruction.8 7 Thus, the theorist's re-conceptualized "woman"
may share similar characteristics with herself, without addressing
the oppression of those women who are not within her own
conceptualization of "woman."
I do not attempt to propose that one of the above approaches is
the best way to reform the law. I also do not claim that complete
change may be effected by simply adopting the above approaches.
Contingent factors such as the role of the judiciary as well as the
political climate in the legislature must also be considered when
devising law reform programs. Nonetheless, the study of the
essentialism debate and the alternative approaches presented will
provide useful guidelines for future research in the development of
new feminist legal theories. Given the problems with the mainstream approaches to law reform and that essentialism in feminist
legal theories is hard to avoid, it is necessary that a prevailing
paradigm of feminist legal theory be aware of and address the
problems that arise from trying to define the term "woman," which
182. See id.
183. See id. at 167.
184. Id. at 186.
185. See id. at 174-77. Spelman looks to Aristotle to elucidate her point. Aristotle
distinguished power relationships between men and women from power relationships
between men and slaves, both male and female. Thus, in his view, there were at least two
female genders-the female citizen and the female slave. See id. at 172-73.
186. See id. at 176-77.
187. See Marion Smiley, 5 GENDER & Socy 243, 243 (1991) (reviewing ELIZABETH V.
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988)).
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at the very least, includes privileging a particular type of "woman."
Future research should examine the feasibility of existing alternative approaches that reach beyond the essentialism debate.
Moreover, the identification of additional problems with
essentialism and the exploration of alternative approaches which
are capable of addressing such problems are compelling issues
beyond the debate which the feminist legal theorists must confront.
These are necessary hurdles that all feminist legal theorists must
overcome if they seek to shape a body of law that accurately
addresses the needs of all women.

